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Abstract: According to Smarandache’s neutrosophy, the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
contains the truth, the falsehood, and the indeterminacy of a statement under consideration.
It is shown in this paper that the proof of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is faulty, because
all possible situations are not considered (such as the situation where from some axioms
wrong results can be deducted, for example, from the axiom of choice the paradox of the
doubling ball theorem can be deducted; and many kinds of indeterminate situations, for
example, a proposition can be proved in 9999 cases, and only in 1 case it can be neither
proved, nor disproved). With all possible situations being considered with Smarandache’s
neutrosophy, the Go¨del’s Incompleteness theorem is revised into the incompleteness axiom:
Any proposition in any formal mathematical axiom system will represent, respectively, the
truth (T), the falsehood (F), and the indeterminacy (I) of the statement under consideration,
where T, I, F are standard or non-standard real subsets of ]−0, 1+[. Considering all possible
situations, any possible paradox is no longer a paradox. Finally several famous paradoxes in
history, as well as the so-called unified theory, ultimate theory, · · · , etc. are discussed.
Key words: Smarandache’s Neutrosophy, Go¨del’s Incompleteness theorem, Incomplete-
ness axiom, paradox, unified theory.
The most celebrated results of Go¨del are as follows.
Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem: Any adequate axiomatizable theory is incomplete.
Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem: In any consistent axiomatizable theory which
can encode sequences of numbers, the consistency of the system is not provable in the system.
In literature, the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is usually stated by any formal mathe-
matical axiom system is incomplete, because it always has one proposition that can neither be
proved, nor disproved.
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is a significant result in the history of mathematical logic,
and has greatly influenced to mathematics, physics and philosophy among others. But, any
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theory cannot be the ultimate truth. Accompanying with the science development, new the-
ories will replace the old ones. That is also for the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. This
paper will revise the Go¨del’s Incompleteness theorem into the incompleteness axiom with the
Smarandache’s neutrosophy.
§1. An Introduction to Smarandache’s Neutrosophy
Neutrosophy is proposed by F.Smarandache in 1995. Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy
that studies the origin, nature, and scope of neutralities, as well as their interactions with
different ideational spectra.
This theory considers every notion or idea 〈A〉 together with its opposite or negation
〈Anti−A〉 and the spectrum of neutralities 〈Neut−A〉, i.e., notions or ideas located between
the two extremes, supporting neither 〈A〉 nor 〈Anti−A〉). The 〈Neut−A〉 and 〈Anti −A〉
ideas together are referred to as 〈Non−A〉.
Neutrosophy is the base of neutrosophic logic, neutrosophic set, neutrosophic probability
and statistics used in engineering applications, especially for software and information fusion,
medicine, military, cybernetics and physics, etc..
Neutrosophic Logic is a general framework for unification of existent logics, such as the
fuzzy logic, especially intuitionistic fuzzy logic, paraconsistent logic, intuitionistic logic,· · · ,
etc.. The main idea of Neutrosophic Logic (NL) is to characterize each logical statement in a
3D Neutrosophic Space, where each dimension of the space represents respectively the truth
(T), the falsehood (F), and the indeterminacy (I) of the statement under consideration, where
T, I, F are standard or non-standard real subsets of ]−0, 1+[ without necessarily connection
between them.
More information on Neutrosophy may be found in references [1-3].
§2. Some Errors in the Proof of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem
It has been pointed out some errors in the proofs of Go¨del’s first and second incompleteness
theorems in the reference [4]. This paper will again show that the proof of Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorems contain some errors, but from other point of view. It will be shown that in the
proof of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, all possible situations are not considered.
First, in the proof, the following situation is not considered: wrong results can be deduced
from some axioms. For example, from the axiom of choice a paradox, the doubling ball theo-
rem, can be deduced, which says that a ball of volume 1 can be decomposed into pieces and
reassembled into two balls both of volume 1. It follows that in certain cases, the proof of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem may be faulty.
Second, in the proof of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, only four situations are considered,
that is, one proposition can be proved to be true, cannot be proved to be true, can be proved
to be false, cannot be proved to be false and their combinations such as one proposition can
neither be proved to be true nor be proved to be false. But those are not all possible situations.
In fact, there may be many kinds of indeterminate situations, including it can be proved to be
true in some cases and cannot be proved to be true in other cases; it can be proved to be false
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in some cases and cannot be proved to be false in other cases; it can be proved to be true in
some cases and can be proved to be false in other cases; it cannot be proved to be true in some
cases and cannot be proved to be false in other cases; it can be proved to be true in some cases
and can neither be proved to be true, nor be proved to be false in other cases; and so on.
Because so many situations are not considered, we may say that the proof of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem is faulty, at least, is not one with all sided considerations.
In order to better understand each case, we consider an extreme situation where one
proposition as shown in Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem can neither be proved, nor disproved.
It may be assumed that this proposition can be proved in 9999 cases, only in 1 case it can
neither be proved, nor disproved. We will see whether or not this situation has been considered
in the proof of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem.
Some people may argue that, this situation is equivalent to that of a proposition can
neither be proved, nor disproved. But the difference lies in the distinction between the part
and the whole. If one case may represent the whole situation, many important theories cannot
be applied. For example the general theory of relativity involves singular points; the law of
universal gravitation does not allow the case where the distance r is equal to zero. Accordingly,
whether or not one may say that the general theory of relativity and the law of universal
gravitation cannot be applied as a whole? Similarly, the situation also cannot be considered
as the one that can be proved. But, this problem may be easily solved with the neutrosophic
method.
Moreover, if we apply the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem to itself, we may obtain the fol-
lowing possibility: in one of all formal mathematical axiom systems, the Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem can neither be proved, nor disproved.
If all possible situations can be considered, the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem can be im-
proved in principle. But, with our boundless universe being ever changing and being extremely
complex, it is impossible considering all possible situations. As far as considering all possible
situations is concerned, the Smarandache’s neutrosophy is a quite useful way, and possibly
the best. Therefore this paper proposes to revise the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem into the
incomplete axiom with Smarandache’s neutrosophy.
§3. The Incompleteness Axiom
Considering all possible situations with Smarandache’s neutrosophy, one may revise the Go¨del’s
Incompleteness theorem into the incompleteness axiom following.
Any proposition in any formal mathematical axiom system will represent the truth (T), the
falsehood (F), and the indeterminacy (I) of the statement under consideration, where T, I, F
are standard or non-standard real subsets of ]−0, 1+[, respectively.
§4. Several Famous Paradoxes in History
The proof of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem has a close relation with some paradoxes. However,
after considering all possible situations, any paradox may no longer be a paradox.
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Now we discuss several famous paradoxes in history.
Example 1. The Barber paradox, one of Russell’s paradoxes.
Consider all men in a small town as members of a set. Now imagine that a barber puts up
a sign in his shop that reads I shave all those men, and only those men, who do not shave
themselves. Obviously, we may divide the set of men in this town into two subsets, those who
shave themselves, and those who are shaved by the barber. To which subset does the barber
himself belong? The barber cannot belong to the first subset, because if he shaves himself, he
will not be shaved by the barber, or by himself; he cannot not belong to the second subset as
well, because if he is really shaved by the barber, or by himself, he will not be shaved by the
barber.
Now we will see from where comes the contradiction.
The contradiction comes from the fact that the barber’s rule does not take all possible
situations into consideration.
First, we should divide the set of men in this town into three subsets, those who shave
themselves, those who are shaved by the barber, and those who neither shave themselves, nor
are shaved by the barber. This contradiction can be avoided by the neutrosophy as follows.
If the barber belongs to the third subset, no contradiction will appear. For this purpose, the
barber should declare himself that he will be the third kind of person, and from now on, he will
not be shaved by anyone; otherwise, if the barber’s mother is not a barber, he can be shaved
by his mother.
Second, the barber cannot shave all men in this town. For example, the barber cannot
shave those who refuse to be shaved by the barber. Therefore, if the barber is the one who
cannot shave himself and ”who refuse to be shaved by the barber” , no contradiction will occur.
There also exist indeterminate situations to avoid the contradiction. The barber may say:
If I meet men from another universe, I will shave myself, otherwise I will not shave myself.
Example 2. Liar’s paradox, another Russell’s paradox.
Epimenides was a Cretan who said that all Cretans are liars. Is this statement true or false? If
this statement is true, he (a Cretan) is a liar, therefore, this statement is false; if this statement
is false, that means that he is not a liar, this statement will be true. Therefore, we always come
across a contradiction.
Now we will see from where comes the contradiction.
First, here the term ”liar” should be defined. Considering all possible situations, a ”liar”
can be one of the following categories: those whose statements are all lies; those whose state-
ments are partly lies, and partly truths; those whose statements are partly lies, partly truths
and sometimes it is not possible to judge whether they are truths or lies. For the sake of con-
venience, at this movement we do not consider the situation where it is not possible to judge
whether the statements are true or false.
Next, the first kind of liar is impossible, i.e., a Cretan could not be a liar whose state-
ments are all lies. This conclusion can not be reached by deduction, instead, it is obtained
through experience and general knowledge. With the situation where a liar’s statements are
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partly truths, and partly lies, Epimenides’ statement all Cretans are liars, will not cause any
contradiction. According to the definitions of liar of the second category and the fact that
Epimenides’ statements could not be all lies, this particular statement of Epimenides’ can be
true and with his other statements being possibly lies, Epimenides may still be a liar.
This contradiction can be avoided by the neutrosophy as follows.
For this statement of all Cretans are liars, besides true or false, we should consider the
situation where it is not possible to judge whether the statement is true or false. According to
this situation, this Russell’s paradox can be avoided.
Example 3. Dialogue paradox.
Considering the following dialogue between two persons A and B.
A: what B says is true.
B: what A says is false.
If the statement of A is true, it follows that the statement of B is true, that is, the statement
what A says is false is true, which implies that the statement of A must be false. We come to
a contradiction.
On the other hand, if the statement of A is false, it follows that the statement of B must
be false, that is, the statement what A says is false is false, which implies that the statement
of A must be true. We also come to a contradiction.
So the statement of A could neither be true nor false.
Now we will see that how to solve this contradiction.
It should be noted that, this dialogue poses a serious problem. If A speaks first, before B
says anything, how can A know whether or not what B says is true? Otherwise, if B speaks
first, B would not know whether what A says is true or false. If A and B speak at the same
time, they would not know whether the other’s statement is true or false.
For solving this problem, we must define the meaning of lie. In general situations a lie may
be defined as follows:
with the knowledge of the facts of cases, a statement does not show with the facts.
But in order to consider all possible situations, especially those in this dialogue, another
definition of lie must be given. For the situation when one does not know the facts of the case,
and one makes a statement irresponsibly, can this statement be defined as a lie? There exist
two possibilities: it is a lie, and it is not a lie. For either possibility, the contradiction can be
avoided.
Consider the first possibility, i.e., it is a lie.
If A speaks first, before B makes his statement, it follows that A does not know the facts
of the case, and makes the statement irresponsibly, it is a lie. Therefore the statement of A is
false. B certainly also knows this point, therefore B’s statement: what A says is false is a truth.
Whereas, if B speaks first before A makes his statement, it follows that B does not know
the facts of the case, and makes the statement irresponsibly, it is a lie. Therefore the statement
of B is false. A certainly also knows this point, therefore A’s statement: what B says is true is
false.
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If A and B speak at the same time, it follows that A and B do not know the facts of
the case, and make their statements irresponsibly, these statements are all lies. Therefore, the
statements of A and B are all false.
Similarly, consider the second possibility, i.e., it is not a lie, the contradiction can be also
avoided.
If we do not consider all the above situations, what can we do? With a lie detector! The
results of the lie detector can be used to judge whose statement is true, whose statement is
false.
§5. On the So-Called Unified Theory, Ultimate Theory and So on
Since Einstein proposed the theory of relativity, the so-called unified theory, ultimate theory
and so on have made their appearance.
Not long ago, some scholars pointed out that if the physics really has the unified theory,
ultimate theory or theory of everything, the mathematical structure of this theory also is
composed by the finite axioms and their deductions. According to the Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem, there inevitably exists a proposition that cannot be derived by these finite axioms and
their deductions. If there is a mathematical proposition that cannot be proved, there must be
some physical phenomena that cannot be forecasted. So far all the physical theories are both
inconsistent, and incomplete. Thus, the ultimate theory derived by the finite mathematical
principles is impossible to be created.
The above discussion is based on the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. With Smarandache’s
neutrosophy and the incompleteness axiom, the above discussion should be revised.
For example, the proposition this theory is the ultimate theory should represent respective
the truth (T), the falsehood (F) and the indeterminacy (I) of the statement under consideration,
where T, I, F are standard or non-standard real subsets of ]−0, 1+[.
Now we discuss the proposition Newton’s law of gravity is the ultimate theory of gravitation
(Proposition A).
According to the Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, the ultimate theory is impossible, there-
fore, the above proposition is 0% true, 0% indeterminate, and 100% false. It may be written as
(0, 0, 1).
While according to the incomplete axiom, we may say that the Proposition A is 16.7% true,
33.3% indeterminate, and 50% false. It may be written as (0.167, 0.333, 0.500). The reason for
this sentence is on the following.
Consider the containing relation between the ultimate theory of gravitation and Newton’s
law of gravity. According to the incompleteness axiom, the proposition the ultimate theory of
gravitation contains Newton’s law of gravity (Proposition B) should represent respective the
truth (T), the falsehood (F) and the indeterminacy (I). For the sake of convenience, we may
assume that T = I = F = 33.3%.
If the Proposition B is equivalent to the Proposition A , the Proposition A also is 33.3%
true, 33.3% indeterminate, and 33.3% false. But they are not equivalent. Therefore we have to
see how the ultimate theory of gravitation contains Newton’s law of gravity. As is known, to
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establish the field equation of the general theory of relativity, one has to do a series of math-
ematical reasoning according to the principle of general covariance and so on, with Newton’s
law of gravity as the final basis. Suppose that the ultimate theory of gravitation is similar to
the general theory of relativity, it depends upon some principle and Newton’s law of gravity.
Again this principle and Newton’s law of gravity are equally important, they all have the same
share of truthfulness, namely 16.7% (one half of 33.3%), but the 16.7% shared by this princi-
ple may be added to 33.3% for falsehood. Therefore, the Proposition A is 16.7% true, 33.3%
indeterminate, and 50% false. It may be written as (0.167, 0.333, 0.500).
This conclusion indicates that Newton’s law of universal gravitation will continue to occupy
a proper position in the future gravitational theory.
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